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Comment
The All New (International) "People's Court": The
Future of the Direct Effect Clause After Voest-Alpine
Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China
Matthew Bensen*
Over the past ten years, economic reform in former com-
munist and developing countries has stimulated significant
change and expansion in the global marketplace. In an effort
to encourage foreign investment, developing countries have in-
creasingly entered the market as private parties engaging in
commercial transactions.' Foreign governments now play a
prominent role in international finance, investment, and trade
in industries such as shipping, agriculture, banking transac-
tions, and oil production.2 While this participation has created
more international opportunities for American business, the
benefits have not come without consequence. Greater interac-
tion with foreign governments has increased the potential for
international commercial disputes.3 These disputes raise the
question of when U.S. courts can exercise jurisdiction over for-
eign sovereigns participating in international commercial
transactions.
The Fifth Circuit recently dealt with this issue in Voest-
Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China.4 At issue in the
case was an agreement between Voest-Alpine, an American cor-
poration, and the Jiangyin Foreign Trade Corporation (JFTC), a
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1996,
University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN.
1. See Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obliga-
tions, 39 HARV. INTL L.J. 1, 1 (1998); see also Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
2. See JOHN R. STEVENSON ET AL., UNITED STATES LAW OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 1-3 (1983).
3. See Richard Wydeven, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976:
A Contemporary Look at Jurisdiction Under the Commercial Activity Excep-
tion, 13 REv. LITIG. 143, 143 (1993).
4. 142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 591 (1998).
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company based in China, for the overseas delivery of roughly
one million dollars worth of styrene monomer.5 The Bank of
China, a government instrumentality, provided security for
JFTC's payment obligation by issuing an irrevocable letter of
credit in the amount of 1.2 million dollars.6 After performing
its part of the agreement, Voest-Alpine contacted the Bank of
China requesting payment 7 but was told in response that
JFTC had refused to issue payment.8
Voest-Alpine subsequently brought an action against the
Bank of China seeking damages for breach of the letter of
credit.9 The Bank of China moved to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction and improper venue, asserting its immunity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)Y° Citing several cir-
cuit court decisions, the Bank of China maintained that it was
entitled to immunity because it had not engaged in any "legally
significant act" in the United States.1 The Fifth Circuit re-
jected this argument, holding that a financial loss incurred in
the United States by an American plaintiff supports jurisdic-
tion over a foreign government if it is an "immediate conse-
quence" of the defendant's activity.' 2
The decision in Voest-Alpine departs significantly from re-
cent interpretations of the FSIA. Circuit courts have generally
interpreted the Act as imposing a requirement that a foreign
sovereign participating in commercial transactions outside the
United States commit some "legally significant act" in the
United States before being subjected to jurisdiction.1 3 In con-
trast, the court in Voest-Alpine expressly rejected the legally
significant act requirement, opting instead for a lower stan-
dard that favors jurisdiction over sovereign immunity.' 4 This
preference for jurisdiction may ultimately cause foreign gov-
5. See id. at 890.
6. See id.
7. See id. Voest-Alpine sought to collect on the irrevocable letter of
credit as payment for the delivery. See i
8. See id. It is not entirely clear why JFTC refused to pay, but they
claimed that there were discrepancies in the documents for presentment to
the Bank of China.
9. See id. at 890-91.
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994).
11. See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 894.
12. See id. at 897.
13. See discussion infra Part I.E.
14. See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 894-95.
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ernments to avoid transactions with American businesses,
thereby affecting the stability of the international market.15
This Comment argues that the Fifth Circuit erred in re-
jecting the legally significant act requirement. Part I discusses
the history of sovereign immunity in the United States, the de-
velopment of the FSIA, and subsequent interpretations of the
commercial activities exception. Part H discusses the Fifth
Circuit's holding and reasoning in Voest-Alpine. Part III ar-
gues that the court improperly rejected the legally significant
act requirement and outlines the problems associated with ex-
tending the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts. Finally, this
Comment concludes that the standard articulated in Voest-
Alpine is insufficient to ensure stability in foreign markets.
The legally significant act requirement provides a better solu-
tion because it represents a fair compromise between protect-
ing American business and respecting foreign sovereignty.
I. THE ROAD TO THE MODERN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
EXCEPTION
A. THE THEORY OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY AND ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN UNITED STATES COURTS
The traditional concept of sovereign immunity held that
domestic courts should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over
a foreign state. 16 The historical basis for granting immunity
was reflected in the old maxim rex non potest peccare,17 which
suggested that sovereign equals have no dominion over each
other. 8 In more recent times, the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity has been supported by the view that it is necessary to re-
spect the independence, equality, and dignity of foreign
states.
19
15. See Stephen J. Leacock, The Joy of Access to the Zone of Inhibition:
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. and the Commercial Activity Exception
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 81, 121 (1996).
16. See William R. Dorsey, IH, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 257, 257 (1997).
17. The phrase rex non potest peccare is Latin for 'the King can do no
wrong." BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 1323 (6th ed. 1990).
18. See Leacock, supra note 15, at 85.
19. See MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON, FOREIGN STATE IMMUNITY IN
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 1-2 (1991).
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United States courts first recognized sovereign immunity
in 1812 in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon. Although
the Court intended its holding to be fact-specific, courts and
commentators have generally agreed that The Schooner Ex-
change established the doctrine of absolute immunity for for-
eign sovereigns in U.S. courts. 21 Domestic courts could not ex-
ercise jurisdiction over foreign states irrespective of whether
they were engaged in governmental or commercial acts.
22
B. THE SHIFT TO A RESmICTIVE THEORY OF IMMUNITY
The amount of protection afforded to foreign sovereigns
under the doctrine of absolute immunity was "increasingly
criticized ... throughout the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury."23 As foreign states engaged in more commercial activi-
20. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The Schooner Exchange involved a li-
bel and arrest claim made by United States plaintiffs against a French war-
ship. Id. at 117. The plaintiffs claimed that they had operated the vessel pri-
vately, and that it left the U.S. en route to Spain. See id. Months later,
Napoleon's army seized the ship and converted it into a military vessel. See
id. The ship later sailed into United States waters near Philadelphia, where
the plaintiffs brought suit. See id. The Supreme Court held the vessel to be
immune from suit, relying on a theory of absolute sovereign immunity. See id
at 146-47; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
486 (1983) (discussing the decision in The Schooner Exchange).
21. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486 ("[The] opinion came to be regarded as
extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns."); see also David
E. Gohlke, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining "A Direct Effect
in the United States" Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Re-
public of Argentina v. Weltover, 18 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 261, 265 (1995) (noting
that application of absolute immunity is generally traced to The Schooner Ex-
change). There is some indication in the opinion, however, that the Court
might have accepted a restrictive theory even at this early date. The Court
noted that "a prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country...
may be considered [to be] laying down the prince, and assuming the character
of a private individual." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145. The restrictive theory sur-
faced again in a later case, where the Court suggested that when a govern-
ment actively participates as a partner in a commercial venture, it divests it-
self of its sovereign character, and takes on that of a private citizen. See Bank
of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907
(1824).
22. See Dorsey, supra note 16, at 258.
23. Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" out of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Ex-
ception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489, 496 (1992); see id. at 496 n.31 (listing com-
mentators who criticized absolute immunity). Donoghue also notes that "[tihe
notion of absolute sovereignty... declined in importance, and by the end of
the Second World War commentators generally agreed that state sovereignty
was a relative notion limited by the sovereignty of other states." Id. at 496-97
(citations omitted). The initial decline in the notion of absolute sovereignty
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ties that resulted in commercial disputes, the potential for non-
U.S. sovereigns to abuse sovereign immunity had increased.24
This prompted the State Department in 1952 to alter its posi-
tion on the question of immunity and release the "Tate letter"
announcing the adoption of a restrictive theory of sovereignimmunity. 25 Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity
is limited to a foreign government's public acts (jure imperi)
and does not extend to suits involving its commercial or private
acts (jure gestionis).26
Adoption of the restrictive theory, however, did not elimi-
nate concerns over the possible abuse of sovereign immunity.
27
Diplomatic pressure and political considerations often led the
began in Europe at the 1926 Brussels Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels. See GORDON,
supra note 19, at 1-4. This convention established immunity rules equating
publicly-owned merchant vessels with those privately-owned, which meant
that immunity would be denied to foreign states when they operated state-
owned merchant vessels. See id. Twenty nations signed the Convention in
1926, but the United States did not participate. See id.
24 See Avi Lew, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.: Interpreting the
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act's Commercial Activity Exception to Jurisdic-
tional Immunity, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 726, 731-32 (1994) ("As sovereigns
increased their participation in the world market, there was an increase in
the possibility that nations could invoke the sovereign immunity defense....
Therefore, the potential for non-U.S. sovereigns to abuse sovereign immunity
had increased."); see also STEVENSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 1-3 (explaining
that foreign governments not only engaged in a substantial amount of bor-
rowing, but also participated more directly and frequently in many forms of
international trade and transactions). This increased participation led to the
need for more stability in international contracts. See id. at 2-3. Persistent
strains on the economies of certain countries increased the possibility that
foreign governments could default on their commercial obligations. See id. As
a result, parties involved in transactions with sovereign entities sought ade-
quate legal safeguards to ensure that commercial disputes were properly ad-
judicated. See id.
25. See JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND
THEIR CORPORATIONS 7 (1988). The Tate letter noted that most countries that
had previously supported the classical theory had ratified the Brussels Con-
vention of 1926. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Depart-
ment of State, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952),
reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunbill, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976) (app. 2 to opinion of White, J.)
[hereinafter Tate Letter]. Recognizing that there was little support remaining
for the absolute theory, the letter suggested a change in U.S. policy. See id.
26. See Tate Letter, supra note 25.
27. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487
(1983); Dorsey, supra note 16, at 258; Nicholas J. Evanoff, Direct Effect Juris-
diction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Ending the
Chaos in the Circuit Courts, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 629, 633 (1991).
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State Department to suggest immunity in cases where it
should not have been available.28 In addition, courts were gen-
erally left with little guidance to determine the existence of
immunity without clear indication from the State Depart-
ment.29 Ultimately, determinations of immunity were being
"made in two different branches, subject to a variety of factors,
sometimes including diplomatic considerations."30 Private par-
ties who had chosen to deal with foreign governments were
subjected to governing standards that were unclear and incon-
sistently applied.31
This uncertainty eventually led the State Department,
along with the Justice Department, to propose a bill codifying
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.32 The resulting
legislation set forth standards governing the circumstances
under which private parties can maintain a lawsuit against a
foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United States.
33
28. See STEVENSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 15 (noting that improper
grants of immunity often resulted when governments pressured the State De-
partment to recognize sovereign immunity).
29. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487; GORDON, supra note 19, at 4-2. Ide-
ally, the State Department intended to make determinations regarding sover-
eign immunity and then communicate them to courts. See GORDON, supra
note 19, at 4-2. However, this practice was not necessarily followed. See id.
In situations where the State Department felt that a request for immunity
should be denied, it usually informed the foreign embassy but not the court.
See id. Without information regarding the State Department's determination,
courts did not know if the State Department had considered the request and
rejected it, or not considered it at all. See id. The State Department's failure
to communicate made it difficult for courts to defer to determinations that
immunity should be denied. See id.
30. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
31. See id.
32. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 25, at 8.
33. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, H.R. REP. No. 94-
1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604. The standards set
forth in the FSIA were intended to be the "sole and exclusive standards to be
used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states be-
fore Federal and State courts in the United States." Id. at 6610. As such, the
Act preempts all other state and federal law regarding the issue of immunity
of foreign states with the exception of international agreements. See GORDON,
supra note 19, at 6-3.
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C. CODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY: THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND THE COMMERCIAL ACTiviTIES
EXCEPTION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)34
had four objectives: (1) to codify the restrictive principle of sov-
ereign immunity; (2) to insure that the principle of restrictiveimmunity was used in U.S. courts; (3) to provide a statutory
procedure for making service upon and obtaining in personam
jurisdiction over a foreign state; and (4) to provide a remedy for
a post-judgment creditor if a foreign state failed to satisfy a fi-
nal judgment.35 As a codified theory of restrictive immunity,
the FSIA was designed to balance the competing interests in
providing American individuals with a forum to adjudicate
commercial disputes and the interests of foreign governments
in being free from excessive litigation.
36
Under the FSIA's theory of restrictive immunity, a sover-
eign state is immune from suit unless its activities fall within
an enumerated set of exceptions. 7 One of the most commonly
invoked is the commercial activity exception,3 which poses two
requirements: the sovereign state must engage in a commercial
activity;39 and the commercial activity must, at a minimum,
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,1602-1611 (1994).
35. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7, 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604.
36. See Donoghue, supra note 23, at 520-21; see also Colonial Bank v.
Compagnie Generale Maritime et Financiere, 645 F. Supp. 1457, 1465
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (warning that without some limit on the jurisdictional reach
of U.S. courts, the "proclivity of the United States population to devise law-
suits for every contretemps" would subject foreign sovereigns to excessive liti-
gation).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604. Section 1605 contains seven classes of excep-
tions to immunity from jurisdiction. These exceptions encompass several dif-
ferent situations, ranging from waiver of immunity, participation in commer-
cial markets and contested rights in property, to money damages and liens on
maritime property. See id. §1605(a)(1)-(7).
38. See id. § 1605(a)(2). The statute provides:
[A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case] in which the action is:
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
39. See id. Whether a sovereign's activities are characterized as
"commercial" depends on whether the underlying acts are considered "public,"
in which case immunity is available, or "private," in which case the commer-
0031999]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cause a "direct effect" in the United States. 40 The "direct effect"
language, however, has been referred to as a "problematic
phrase"41 because it does not provide a clear standard for de-
termining what types of effects are sufficient to subject foreign
governments to jurisdiction in U.S. courts.4 2
. INTERPRETING THE DIRECT EFFECT CLAUSE: NARROW
VERSUS BROAD INTERPRETATIONS AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
DEcISIoN IN REPUBLIC OFARGENTINA v. WELTOVER, INC.
Congress did not provide a definition of "direct effect" in
the FSIA, and there is little legislative history regarding the
meaning of the clause. It is discussed in one short, non-specific
paragraph of a House Report.43 The House Report suggests
that courts determine jurisdiction based on the principles set
forth in section eighteen of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations, but does not articulate a clear standard of its own.4
cial activity exception applies. Courts have employed two different doctrines
in making this distinction. The first is the "nature" test, which is "an objec-
tive inquiry into whether the act could be performed by a private or ordinary
person." DELLAPENNA, supra note 25, at 148. If the act is such that an ordi-
nary or private citizen could perform it, it is a "private" commercial act and
the state will not be entitled to immunity. See id. If, however, the act is one
that only a public authority could perform, it is a public governmental act andimmunity is available. See id. The second doctrine is the "purpose" test, un-
der which "an act is private or public according to whether it serves a public
or private purpose." See id. Although authorities do not generally agree on
what constitutes a public purpose, a state's contract is arguably immune from
suit if it serves a public purpose and can be considered an act of government.
See id. If, however, it is intended to have a commercial effect, then the for-
eign state is not immune from suit. See id.
Congress tried to clarify this confusion by declaring in the FSIA that
"Ithe commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct ... rather than by reference to its pur-
pose." 28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (emphasis added). However, the explanation and
examples of what constitutes a "commercial activity" provided by Congress
did not completely resolve the issue. Courts still are not consistent in decid-
ing whether particular transactions are commercial. See DELLAPENNA, supra
note 25, at 152.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
41. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 311-312 (2d Cir. 1981).
42. See Gohlke, supra note 21, at 271.
43. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 19 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6618.
44. The House envisioned that the direct effect clause "would embrace
commercial conduct abroad having direct effects within the United States
which would subject such conduct to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United
States consistent with principles set forth in section 18, Restatement of the
[Vol. 83:9971004
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Given this scant guidance as to the meaning of the clause,
it is no surprise that circuit courts have interpreted the "direct
effect" language in different ways.45 The majority of courts
have adopted a narrow view, accepting the language of section
eighteen and finding that the term "direct effect" requires a
substantial impact in the United States that is a directly fore-
seeable result of the extraterritorial conduct.4 6  The Second
Law, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States." H.R. REP. No. 94-
1487, at 19 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6618; see also DEL-
LAPENNA, supra note 25, at 90-92; Evanoff, supra note 27, at 637 ("The only
interpretive guidance provided the courts as to the meaning of 'direct effect in
the United States' is a cryptic reference to section 18 .... This lack of guid-
ance ... has led to considerable confusion and divergence of opinion, first in
the district courts, and now in the circuit courts.").
According to section 18, "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and
causes an effect within its territory, if ... the effect within the territory is
substantial and occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct out-
side the territory." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965). Thus, a foreign state is not liable for an ef-
fect in the United States unless the effect is direct, substantial, and foresee-
able. See id.
45. See Gohlke, supra note 21, at 274 (discussing the emergence of two
different views of the meaning of "direct effect in the United States" in the
circuit courts).
46. See Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 453 (6th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a foreign state's commercial activity may satisfy the
direct effect clause if the consequences of the extraterritorial act were the
foreseeable result of the conduct); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101,
1111 (5th Cir. 1985) (relying on section 18 to determine that "the conduct
must have a 'substantial' effect in the United States 'as a direct and foresee-
able result of the conduct" outside the United States) (citation omitted);
Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that effects on the family of an American citizen who was murdered
in Iran were "not sufficiently 'direct' or 'substantial' to support the assertion of
Federal jurisdiction") (quoting Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488
F. Supp. 1284, 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d
Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 461 U.S. 480 (1983)) (footnote omitted);
Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094,
1111 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that "an effect cannot be deemed direct if it oc-
curs solely because of conduct not reasonably contemplated by the commercial
activity"); Harris Corp. v. Natl Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344,
1351 (11th Cir. 1982) holding that the breach of a letter of credit involved in
the sale of radio transmitters from overseas producers fell within the com-
mercial activity exception because it had "significant, foreseeable ... conse-
quences" in the United States); Harris v. VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056,
1062-63, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that an American citizen's death in a
Moscow hotel fire was an inadequate basis for jurisdiction under the direct
effect requirement). See generally DELLAPENNA, supra note 25, at 90-91.
Dellapenna notes, however, that even in the cases in which courts have relied
upon the language of section 18, the courts did "no more than quote it without
10051999]
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Circuit, by contrast, has eschewed the majority approach in fa-
vor of a narrower view.47 After considering the House Report's
reference to section eighteen, the Second Circuit noted that the
section concerned "the extent to which... American law may
be applied to conduct overseas, not the... extraterritorial ju-
risdictional reach of American courts."48 Concluding that the
"substantial" and "foreseeable" requirement of section eighteen
was 'not necessarily apposite to the direct effect clause,"49 the
Second Circuit articulated its own version of the direct effect
test.50 The Second Circuit's test focused on whether an effect
was "sufficiently 'direct' and sufficiently 'in the United States'
that Congress would have wanted an American court to hear
the case."51
The circuit split between the narrow and broad view even-
tually prompted the Supreme Court to attempt to settle the
confusion surrounding direct effect jurisdiction in Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.52 Weltover involved a suit brought
by several bondholders against the Republic of Argentina for
breach of contract.53 The case turned on the question whether
examining the extensive underlying international practice that the section
seeks to summarize." Id. at 91. Due to the courts' failure in examining this
body of knowledge, Dellapenna argues that section 18 "is little help, without
reference to the underlying international practice, in deciding specific cases."
Id.
47. See Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981). Texas Trading involved four trading companies
that had contracted to sell and deliver shiploads of cement to the government
of Nigeria during the late 1970s. See id. at 302-03. Nigeria entered into over
one hundred contracts with sixty-eight cement suppliers at a total value of
almost one billion dollars. See id. at 303. The quantities of cement purchased
were so great that Nigeria's docks soon became inundated with cement-laden
ships, filling the harbors to such an extent that imports of other essential
goods were forced to cease. See id. at 302. Faced with a crisis, the Nigerian
Government repudiated all unperformed cement contracts. See id. When the
plaintiffs, whose cement contracts had been repudiated, brought suit in New
York, Nigeria moved for dismissal based on its alleged immunity as a foreign
sovereign. See id. The court, however, held that Nigeria was not entitled to
immunity, basing jurisdiction on the financial loss suffered by the American
corporation. See id. at 312.
48. Id. at 311.
49. Id. at 311 n.32.
50. See id at 313.
51. Id.
52. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
53. Id. at 607. In 1981 the Argentine Government instituted the Foreign
Exchange Insurance Contract program (FEIC) in an attempt to remedy the
instability of its currency. See id. at 609. Under the FEIC, Argentina and its
(Vol. 83:9971006
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Argentina's unilateral rescheduling of its debt resulted in a di-
rect effect in the United States sufficient to support jurisdiction
under the FSIA.5 Like many of the circuit courts that had de-
cided the issue, the Supreme Court first considered the House
Report's suggestion that the clause be interpreted based on the
principles set forth in section eighteen of the Restatement.55
Consistent with the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court noted
the inconsistency between the section eighteen concept of ju-
risdiction to legislate and the FSIA's concern with jurisdiction
to adjudicate.5 6 The Court then rejected the suggestion in the
legislative history that the commercial activity exception con-
tains an unexpressed requirement of "substantiality" or
"foreseeability." 57 Instead, the Supreme Court adopted the di-
rect effect test originally suggested by the Second Circuit.58
central bank assumed the risk of currency depreciation in cross-border con-
tracts between Argentine borrowers and foreign creditors by providing the
domestic borrowers with U.S. dollars to pay their international debts. See id.
When the contracts later came due in 1982, currency devaluation had de-
pleted Argentina's funds to such an extent that it could not cover the contrac-
tual obligations. See id As an emergency measure, the Argentine govern-
ment refinanced some of its debts by issuing government bonds (called
"Bonods") to certain creditors. See id. Interest and principal payments on the
bonds were to be paid in U.S. dollars through banks in New York, Frankfurt,
London, or Zurich at the bondholder's option. See id. at 609-10. However,
when the bonds matured in 1986, the Argentine government again lacked suf-
ficient hard currency reserves to retire them, so it unilaterally rescheduled
repayment. See id. The plaintiffs refused to accept Argentina's rescheduling
of the payments and insisted on full repayment in New York according to the
instruments' original terms. See id. When no payments were made, the
plaintiffs brought the action to compel the Argentine government to honor its
obligations. See id.
54. See id. at 617. Another issue the Supreme Court considered was
whether Argentina's default on the bonds was an act performed in connection
with a commercial activity. See id. at 612. Argentina argued that issuance of
the bonds should not be characterized as commercial activity because the in-
struments were not used in a commercial context. See id. at 615-16. Instead,
it argued, the instruments "were created by the Argentine Government to ful-
fill its obligations under a foreign exchange program designed to address a
domestic credit crisis, and as a component of a program designed to control
that nation's critical shortage of foreign exchange." Id. at 616. The Court re-
sponded by saying that it did not matter why Argentina participated in the
bond market as a private actor, only that it did so. See id. at 617.
55. See id. at 617-18.
56. See id at 618; supra text accompanying notes 47-51 (discussing the
Second Circuit's approach).
57. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
58. See id. at 619. The test provided by the Second Circuit states that an
effect is direct if it follows as an immediate consequence of the defendant's
activity. See Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d
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Using this test, the Supreme Court easily concluded that Ar-
gentina's unilateral rescheduling of the maturity dates on its
government bonds had a direct effect in the United States.
59
E. THE AFTERMATH OF WELTOVER: SUBSEQUENT
INTERPRETATIONS IN CIRCUIT COURTS
Although the Weltover decision represented an attempt to
clarify the ambiguity surrounding the direct effect language of
the commercial activity exception, the Supreme Court failed to
offer future courts any clear direction.60 Application of the di-
rect effect clause in subsequent cases has proven to be varied
and unpredictable, with at least one court admitting that it
"struggled to identify objective standards that would aid in de-
termining what does and does not qualify as a 'direct effect in
the United States." 61
Lacking the guidance of the "substantial" and "foreseeable"
test adopted by many courts prior to Weltover, and faced with a
Supreme Court decision that seemed "hopelessly ambiguous,"62
several courts looked for a more definitive standard to help de-
termine what qualifies as a direct effect.63 As a result, the Sec-
ond, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits grafted a new require-
ment onto the direct effect test.64 Under their new standard, a
Cir. 1991), affd, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
59. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618-19. According to the Court's reasoning,
the fact that New York was the place of performance for the contract was the
decisive factor in deciding whether a direct effect occurred in the United
States. See id. at 619. When Argentina failed to honor the bonds, money that
was supposed to have been delivered to a New York bank for deposit was not
forthcoming. See id.
The Court rejected the argument advanced by Argentina that the direct
effect requirement cannot be satisfied where the plaintiffs are all foreign cor-
porations. See id. at 618-19. Relying on its decision in Verlinden B.V. v. Cen-
tral Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), the Court noted that the FSIA
"permits 'a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign sovereign in the courts of the
United States, provided the substantive requirements of the Act are satis-
fied.' Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619 (quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 489).
60. See Gohlke, supra note 21, at 285; Lew, supra note 24, at 774-75.
61. United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d
1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 1994).
62. Id.
63. Although the court in United World Trade felt as though it were left
with little direction to determine what qualifies as a direct effect, it noted that
it would consider the Supreme Court's example in Weltover while applying the
statute to the facts before it. See id.
6{ See Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33
(2d Cir. 1993); General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376 (8th
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foreign sovereign is not subject to jurisdiction under the com-
mercial activity exception unless it has engaged in a "legally
significant act" in the United States.65 Courts have generally
defined "legally significant act" as an act giving rise to a cause
Cir. 1993); Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 1997);
United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33 F.3d 1232
(10th Cir. 1994). Antares Aircraft involved an action brought by an American
Partnership against the Federal Republic of Nigeria for conversion of an air-
plane. 999 F.2d at 34. After the plane was finally returned, Antares filed an
action in New York to recover damages for conversion of the plane, arguing
that their financial loss as a result of the tort constituted a direct effect that
occurred in the United States. See id. at 36. However, the court refused to
exert jurisdiction because all of the legally significant acts took place in Nige-
ria. See id.
The Eighth Circuit encountered the direct effect clause in General Elec-
tric Capital Corporation v. Grossman, a case involving an action brought by
General Electric, Gelco, and International Couriers Corporation against Air
Canada and some Canadian accounting partnerships. 991 F.2d at 1378. The
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants conspired to suppress information
about Gelco's financial status in order to dupe General Electric into buying
the company at an inflated price. See id. at 1379. The court agreed with the
defendant's claim of immunity, and dismissed the case due to a lack of juris-
diction. See id. at 1384.
The Ninth circuit interpreted the direct effect language in Adler v. Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria, a case involving an action brought by an assignee
over the right to receive payment on a Nigerian government contract to com-
puterize oil fields. 107 F.3d at 720. When the Nigerian government failed to
pay the money, Adler filed suit in New York for breach of contract, arguing
that Nigeria's failure to make payment to his account in New York caused a
direct effect in the United States. See id. at 723. The court denied Nigeria
sovereign immunity under the FSIA, concluding that Nigeria engaged in a le-
gally significant act in the United States. See id. at 730.
United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Association, a
case decided by the Tenth Circuit, involved a complex agreement for the sale
of oil. 33 F.3d at 1235. UWT entered into an agreement with MOP to the ef-
fect that MOP would provide UWT with shipments of crude oil. See id. UWT
contracted to make payment to MOP in U.S. dollars by irrevocable letters of
credit opened by a European/USA bank and notified through an advising
bank. See id. Although the first two shipments went smoothly, a problem
arose with the third shipment. See id. at 1236. MOP thereafter refused to
supply any additional oil to UWT. See id. UWT then brought suit in Colorado
for breach of contract, alleging jurisdiction based on the direct effect clause.
See id. UWT contended that there was a direct effect in the U.S. because
money that was supposed to have been paid in the United States was not
transferred because of defendant's breach of contract. See id. at 1237. Dis-
tinguishing the case from Weltover, the court noted that "no part of the con-
tract in this case was to be performed in the United States." Id. The court
concluded that MOP was immune from jurisdiction because all of the legally
significant acts occurred in Europe and not in the United States. See id. at
1239.
65. See Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 36; General Elec. Capital Corp., 991
F.2d at 1385; Adler, 107 F.3d at 730; United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1237-38.
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of action in U.S. courts. 66 In other words, an act has "legal sig-
nificance" only if the aggrieved party can show that the foreign
government engaged in some activity in the United States
which, jurisdictional issues aside, would support a cause of ac-
tion in our courts. 67 The legally significant act requirement ob-
viously makes it more difficult to grant jurisdiction over foreign
governments;68 as one circuit court put it, it is designed to pre-
vent interpretations of the direct effect clause "that would give
the district courts jurisdiction over virtually any suit arising
out of an overseas transaction in which an American citizen
claims to have suffered a loss from the acts of a foreign state."69
Although the legally significant act requirement does pro-
vide a uniform standard for granting sovereign immunity, it
has generated concern over American business interests.70 The
requirement is arguably more protective of foreign govern-
ments, and makes it slightly more difficult to obtain jurisdic-
tion over a sovereign entity.7 ' As one critic has pointed out, re-
66. See, e.g., Adler, 107 F.3d at 727.
67. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. For example, the Tenth
circuit in United World Trade considered it significant that "no part of the
contract involved in [the] case was to be performed in the United States." 33
F.3d at 1237. The "legally significant acts" were the contract entered into by
UWT and MOP in Moscow, the delivery of oil from Kazakhstan to Sicily, and
the payments by UWT to MOP in Paris. See id. at 1239. Thus, because none
of the acts giving rise to the cause of action actually occurred in the United
States, there was no "direct effect" in the United States. See id.
68. See Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887,
896 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that the Supreme Court in Weltover "admonished
the circuit courts not to add 'any unexpressed requirement[s]' to the third
clause," and arguing that the legally significant act analysis adds an unex-
pressed requirement). The language in some of the circuit court opinions also
suggests that the courts were looking for a standard that would limit jurisdic-
tion in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 36
(noting that "the fact that an American individual or firm suffers some finan-
cial loss from a foreign tort cannot, standing alone, suffice to trigger the ex-
ception"); United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1238 (concluding that it was not the
intent of Congress "to provide jurisdiction whenever the ripples caused by an
overseas transaction manage eventually to reach the shores of the United
States").
69. United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1239.
70. See generally Dean Brockbank, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity
Circle: An Economic Analysis of Nelson v. Saudi Arabia and the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the eco-
nomic ramifications of grants of immunity on American companies and indi-
viduals transacting business with foreign countries).
71. See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 894 (referring indirectly to the legally
significant act requirement as an additional unexpressed requirement to the
commercial activity exception).
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cent interpretations of the commercial activity exception "have
granted immunity as the rule'rather than the exception."
72
Proponents of American business interests argue that grants of
immunity should be limited in order to provide more protection
for the U.S. economic system.73 The increased threat of nonre-
course in dealings with foreign governments ultimately raises
the risks of foreign investment and introduces inefficiencies
into the bargaining process.74 These potential pitfalls implic-
itly factored into the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the legally sig-
nificant act requirement in Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v.
Bank of China.75
11. VOEST-ALPINE TRADING USA CORP. V. BANK OF
CHINA
The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Voest-Alpine Trading
USA Corp. v. Bank of China76 departed significantly from the
reasoning employed by the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
circuits 7 Unlike the other circuits, the Fifth Circuit relied on
a more literal interpretation of the direct effect clause. 8 Thus,
rather than adopting the legally significant act requirement,
the court looked back to the interpretive language originally
set forth in Weltover, which held that "an effect is 'direct' if it
follows 'as an immediate consequence of the defendant's... ac-
tivity' and it need not be foreseeable nor substantial."79
Voest-Alpine refused to adopt the legally significant act re-
quirement developed by the other circuits for two reasons.
First, the Fifth Circuit carefully analyzed the language of the
direct effect clause and concluded that the text of the FSIA
does not support the legally significant act requirement.80
72. Brockbank, supra note 70, at 12.
73. See id. at 20.
74. See id. at 21-23.
75. 142 F.3d 887, 897 (5th Cir. 1998). Although the Fifth Circuit never
makes an explicit reference, the language indirectly suggests that the decision
is intended to be protective of American interests. The holding refers specifi-
cally to "American" plaintiffs and corporations, and wipes away what is con-
sidered an extra, "unexpressed" component of the FSIA. See i at 894-95,
897.
76. 142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998).
77. See discussion supra Part I.E.
78. See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 894-95.
79. I& at 894 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S.
607, 618 (1992)) (citation omitted).
80. See id- at 894.
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Utilizing a strictly textual interpretation, the court reasoned
that the only act that must "give rise to or form the basis of the
cause of action is an act outside the United States."81 In sup-
port of its contention, the Voest-Alpine court noted that the
"Supreme Court [in Weltover] expressly admonished the circuit
courts not to add 'any unexpressed requirement[s]' to the
[direct effect] clause." 2 Because the legally significant act re-
quirement was never expressed in the third clause of the com-
mercial activity exception, it should not have been added to the
direct effect provision.8 3
Second, the Fifth Circuit contended that the legally signifi-
cant act requirement merges the second and third clauses of
the commercial activity exception.84 The court found that, in
effect, both the second clause and the legally significant act re-
quirement base jurisdiction on acts in the United States which
would give rise to a cause of action.85 Therefore, if the third
clause is interpreted to require a legally significant act in the
United States, the second and third clauses become virtually
indistinguishable. 86 The court determined that Congress did
not intend such a "meaningless construction" of the third
clause of the commercial activity exception, and refused to
adopt the legally significant act requirement.87
8L Id
82. Id.
83. See id. Although the other circuits noted that the Supreme Court
employed an analysis similar to the legally significant acts test in deciding
Weltover, the Fifth Circuit argued that "Weltover's reliance on a legally sig-
nificant act in the United States does not justify, much less compel, the con-
clusion that it is or should be some kind of threshold requirement under the
third clause." Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, the court concluded, although
"[a] legally significant act in the United States will certainly cause a direct
effect in the United States ... that does not mean that a direct effect in the
United States can be caused only by a legally significant act in the United
States." Id.
84 See id. at 895.
85. See id. The second clause requires that a cause of action be based
upon (1) an act in the United States (2) in connection with commercial activity
outside the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(2) (1994).
86. See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 895. The court noted, however, that the
clauses may be distinguished by the fact that the third clause would also
"require proof of an act outside the United States upon which the action is
also based and which caused a direct effect in the United States." Id This
interpretation, however, would leave the third clause with no clear purpose
because it would be easier for plaintiffs to invoke the second clause, as it
would not have the extra requirement. See id. Thus, the court concluded that
this interpretation would be useless. See id
87. Id.
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Rather than rely on the legally significant act require-
ment, the court in Voest-Alpine adopted the test set forth in
Weltover, which required that an effect in the United States
need only be an immediate consequence of the foreign state's
activity.88 The Fifth Circuit also cited its earlier decision in
Callejo v. Bancomer, S., 89 where it held that "a financial loss
incurred in the United States by an American plaintiff may
constitute a direct effect that supports jurisdiction under the
third clause."90 More specifically, the court relied on Callejo as
support for the idea that the place of payment and the amount
of contact between a foreign state and the United States were
not decisive factors in the direct effect analysis.
91
Applying these prior decisions, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that Voest-Alpine suffered a "nontrivial" financial loss in the
United States when it did not receive payment from the Bank
of China.92  Furthermore, Voest-Alpine's nonreceipt of funds
occurred "as an 'immediate consequence' of the Bank of China's
actions."93 As a result, the loss was sufficient to support juris-
diction under the third clause of the commercial activity excep-
tion.94 In a much broader sense, Voest-Alpine established that
a financial loss suffered by an American plaintiff in the United
88. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
89. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
90. Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 893 (describing its holding in Callejo).
Callejo involved a breach of contract action arising from the promulgation by
Mexico of exchange rate control regulations. 764 F.2d at 1104. The plaintiffs
sought payment on four certificates of deposit and received a rate of exchange
substantially below the market rate. See id- at 1106. In analyzing whether
Mexico's commercial activity had a direct effect in the United States, the court
concluded that the place of payment was not decisive. See id. at 1112. How-
ever, after examining the longstanding business relationship between the par-
ties, and the substantial harm suffered by the plaintiffs, the court ultimately
found that Mexico's activities did have a direct effect in the United States.
See id.
9L See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 895-96. Callejo clearly asserts that con-
tinuous contact is not important in the context of an FSIA analysis. 764 F.2d
at 1112. Continuous contact is likely to be important, however, in establish-
ing "minimum contacts" for traditional personal jurisdiction purposes. See,
e.g., General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1387 (8th Cir.
1993) (discussing personal jurisdiction and the "minimum contacts" test).
Thus, by suggesting that the amount of contact is inconsequential in a direct
effect analysis, Callejo establishes a standard for jurisdiction that is set even
lower than the minimum contacts standard.
92. Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 896.
93. Id. (quoting the Supreme Court's language in Weltover, 504 U.S. at
618).
94. See id.
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States, if it is an immediate consequence of the defendant's ac-
tivity, is sufficient to support jurisdiction under the third
clause of the commercial activity exception to the FSIA.95
Ill. DEPARTING FROM LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT ACTS:
WHY VOEST-ALPINE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION SPELLS
TROUBLE FOR OVERSEAS TRANSACTIONS
Voest-Alpine set forth a broad standard for determining ju-
risdiction in cases involving commercial transactions between
foreign sovereigns and American corporations.96 Although the
decision represents a fair attempt at interpreting Supreme
Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit's approach to the commer-
cial activity exception may have a negative impact on interna-
tional transactions. Voest-Alpine's strict adherence to the
original language of Weltover and reliance on its earlier opinion
in Callejo establishes a standard that is heavily "skewed to-
ward granting jurisdiction over foreign states."97 The direct ef-
fect clause should be read to include established standards so
that subsequent interpretations do not turn our courts into
"small international courts of claims."98
A. REJECTING THE LEGALLY SIGNIFICANT ACT REQUIREMENT
Although the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
had applied the legally significant act requirement in previous
cases,99 Voest-Alpine refused to adopt the standard.1°° The
court found that the legally significant act requirement was not
supported by the text of the FSIA, and that it rendered the sec-
ond and third provisions of the commercial activity exception
virtually indistinguishable. 10' However, the court's arguments
are based on mistaken assumptions. Nothing in the language
of the FSIA or Weltover actually prohibits the use of this addi-
95. See id. at 897.
96. See supra Part ll.
97. Gohlke, supra note 21, at 283.
98. Id. at 284 (quoting Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against For-
eign States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Gov-
ernmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 25, 31 (1976) (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau)).
99. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
101 See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 894; see also supra notes 85-93 and ac-
companying text.
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tional standard. Furthermore, the legally significant act re-
quirement focuses on entirely different "acts" than the second
clause of the commercial activity exception.
1. Misinterpreting the Words of Weltover
Voest-Alpine misinterpreted the language of Weltover by
suggesting that the legally significant act requirement should
be rejected because it was not explicitly provided for in the text
of the FSIA.10 2 While the Supreme Court "reject[ed] the sug-
gestion that section 1605(a)(2) contains any unexpressed re-
quirement of 'substantiality' or 'foreseeability," 10 3 Weltover did
not prohibit the addition of any requirement not expressed in
the text of the FSIA.1°4 The Supreme Court only addressed the
suggestion that the direct effect clause would be subject to ju-
risdiction consistent with the principles of section eighteen of
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations."°5 Thus, Welto-
ver rejected the idea that an effect is only "direct" if it results
from conduct that has, "as a direct and foreseeable result, a
'substantial' effect within the United States.""6 The Court was
not considering the possibility that circuit courts would adopt a
requirement that acts as a guideline for future interpretation
of the direct effect clause. 07
Although Weltover indicated the Supreme Court's intent to
eliminate the "substantiality" and "foreseeability" require-
ments,'0 8 the legally significant act requirement should not be
equated with these tests. The requirement differs significantly
from the principles rejected in Weltover. While the "fore-
seeability" and "substantiality" requirements tend to concen-
trate on the impact of the activity °9 and whether the parties
102. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
103. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
104. See id.
105. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
106. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
107. Although the language used by Supreme Court, if read broadly, could
be interpreted as rejecting any requirements involving any type of
"substantiality" or "foreseeability" requirement, this interpretation is not con-
sistent with the flow of the Court's argument. The text immediately preced-
ing this assertion clearly refers to the requirements as explained in the Re-
statement, so the Court is quite clearly referring to these principles rather
than making a general assertion. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618.
108. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
109. The test bases extraterritorial application on whether an act had a
"substantial" effect in the United States, which suggests that there is a quan-
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contemplated the effects of the activity,110 the legally signifi-
cant act requirement focuses on the activity's connection with
the United States."' If a foreign state's involvement in com-
mercial markets leads to an actionable claim, the court will
grant jurisdiction if the cause of action establishes that some-
thing legally significant actually occurred in the United
States."2 This requires an aggrieved party to demonstrate
that a major event in the commercial dispute, i.e., the making
of a contract, or the failure to uphold the obligations of a con-
tract, had a direct connection to the United States." 3 This po-
sition is clearly consistent with the reasoning of Weltover. The
Court's rejection in that case of the "substantiality" and
"foreseeability" requirements in favor of the "immediate conse-
quences" test suggests that the Court did not want a test based
solely on the impact of the commercial act in the United
States.114 Instead, the Court focused on the existence of a di-
rect connection between the foreign state's activity and the ef-
fect in the United States. 15 The language of the Court's test
demonstrates this shift in focus: "an effect is 'direct' if it follows
'as an immediate consequence of the defendant's activity." 116
Therefore, unlike the substantiality and foreseeability tests,
the legally significant act requirement is a logical extension of
the Court's conclusion in Weltover. Jurisdiction is essentially
limited to situations in which a foreign state's misconduct is
sufficiently connected to, and results in, a direct effect in the
United States. Collateral effects of the activity are not suffi-
cient to establish jurisdiction. 17
titative measure of the impact. See Gohlke, supra note 21, at 272-73.
110. See id.
111. For a more detailed discussion of this connection, see infra Part
HIl.A.2.
112. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
114. Aside from noting that the two requirements were derived from a sec-
tion of the Restatement that deals with jurisdiction to "legislate" rather than
jurisdiction to "adjudicate," the Court never provided its reasons for rejecting
the "substantiality" and "foreseeability" requirements. See Weltover, 504 U.S.
at 617-18. However, after considering the aim of the "immediate conse-
quences" test and the focus of the other requirements, it seems apparent that
the Court did not want a test based solely on the impact of the commercial act
in the United States.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 618 (quoting Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d
145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991)).
117. Secondary effects, such as those recognized in United World Trade v.
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2. Failing to Distinguish the Second and Third Clauses of the
Exception
Voest-Alpine's most compelling argument suggests that the
legally significant act requirement merges the second and third
clauses of the commercial activity exception. 118 While the court
rightfully indicates that Congress would not condone a duplica-
tive interpretation of the third clause, the court's analysis mis-
characterizes the jurisdictional hook of the legally significant
act requirement. Although the requirement focuses on the lo-
cation of the "legally significant acts,"1 19 and whether these
acts bear some connection to the United States, the court failed
to recognize the distinction between legally significant acts and
the "act" in connection with a commercial activity used to de-
termine the applicable provision of the commercial activity ex-
ception.120  The second clause of the exception only applies
when a foreign government engages in an activity within the
United States that directly results in an actionable claim.
121
For example, if a foreign sovereign and an American corpora-
tion negotiate a contract in the United States, and the foreign
government intentionally misrepresents its position, the activ-
ity would support jurisdiction under the second provision.1 n If,
however, the parties negotiated outside of the U.S., the activity
Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Association, are not sufficient to support ju-
risdiction. 33 F.3d 1232, 1238 (10th Cir. 1994). The contract in United World
Trade, which was the basis for all of the "legally significant acts" of the foreign
state, contained no express connection to the United States. See id. The de-
fendants were not required to make payment in the United States, nor could
they have anticipated what UWT expected to do with the money. See id. In
other words, there was no legal obligation that connected the defendants to
the United States. See id. Therefore, even though the breach of contract ul-
timately prevented UWT from collecting money in the United States, this
"effect" was collateral to the primary cause of action. See id. The legally sig-
nificant act-the failure to pay a London Bank pursuant to the contract-led
to "immediate consequences" in Europe, not in the United States. See id.
118. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
120. The Fifth Circuit assumed that the basis of the cause of action is the
only legally significant act that is considered. See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at
895.
121 See 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2) (1994); supra note 38 (quoting the commer-
cial activity exception).
122. Cf. General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1384 (8th
Cir. 1993) (rejecting the argument that the defendant's issuance of false fi-
nancial information fell within the second clause because most of the negotia-
tions and the underlying accounting and auditing problems took place outside
the United States).
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would not fall within the scope of the second clause because the
actionable "act" did not occur in the U.S.1n In this situation,
the legally significant act requirement can be distinguished
from the second clause of the exception. While the second
clause is clearly not applicable, the outcome can still be decided
using the legally significant act requirement. For example, if
the contract between the foreign government and an American
corporation contains no legal obligations connected to the
United States, there is no legally significant act that would
provide jurisdiction under the third clause of the exception. 124
However, if the contract provisions call for a stated event to oc-
cur within the United States, and the event does not occur as a
result of the foreign government's misconduct, failure to satisfy
the obligation constitutes a legally significant act.12 Unlike
the analysis under the second clause of the commercial activity
exception, this finding does not require a foreign sovereign to
actually engage in an activity within the United States. 26 In-
stead, jurisdiction results from the fact that the failure to up-
hold the contract provision would lead to a direct effect in the
United States. 27
Considering the legally significant act requirement in this
sense, it is entirely possible to separate the "act" of the foreign
state as it is necessary for determining which provision of the
exception is applicable, from the "legally significant acts" that
are useful in measuring whether there has been a "direct ef-
fect" in the United States. 128 The Supreme Court's decision in
Weltover provides a good example. 129 Weltover was decided in
the context of the third clause of the exception because it in-
volved a contract that was conceived, entered into, and, for the
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., United World Trade, 33 F.3d at 1238 (refusing to grant ju-
risdiction because there was no legal obligation that connected defendants to
the United States).
125. See, e.g., Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 727 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that Nigeria was subject to jurisdiction because its failure
to deliver payment to a bank in the U.S. was legally significant).
126. Neither Weltover nor Adler dealt with the second clause because it
was assumed that the foreign government did not engage in any activity in
the United States. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619; Adler, 107 F.3d at 727.
127. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619; Adler, 107 F.3d at 727.
128. See cases cited supra note 64.
129. Weltover is useful because it has been cited for utilizing an analysis
"similar" to the legally significant act requirement. See Antares Aircraft, L.P.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1993).
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most part, executed outside of the United States. 130 However,
the decisive factor in the Court's analysis was the fact that the
contract called for payment in the United States. 131 The Court
focused on the contract's connection with the United States and
placed a strong emphasis on the fact that payment that was
supposed to have been received in New York never arrived ac-
cording to the agreement. 32 This analysis is virtually identical
to the legally significant act requirement. 133 Argentina's fail-
ure to fulfill its contractual obligation was a legally significant
act that had a direct effect in the United States. 134 Nonper-
formance of the obligation to pay gave rise to a breach of con-
tract cause of action. 35 Thus, the Supreme Court's analysis ul-
timately centered on the same basic premise of the legally
significant act requirement; it simultaneously maintained the
distinction between the second and third provisions of the
commercial activity exception and implicitly focused on the
"legally significant" connection between the commercial trans-
action and its domestic impact.13
6
B. VOEST-ALPINE'S RELIANCE ON CALLEJO: Is THERE ANY
LIMIT TO JURISDICTION?
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of its previous decision in
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A 137 is perhaps the most problematic
aspect of Voest-Alpine. The court's interpretation of Callejo
suggests that the amount of contact between a foreign sover-
eign and the United States is inconsequential in a direct effect
analysis. 38 This assertion is troublesome because it marks an
expansion of the jurisdictional reach of the FSIA. In essence,
the court removed any standards that limit jurisdiction. 39
130. 504 U.S. at 609-10.
13L See id. at 618-19.
132. See id.
133. See Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 36.
13 See id. According to the court in Antares Aircraft, "Weltover involved
a breach of contract, and the Court found decisive the fact that the contractu-
ally designated place of performance was New York. The 'legally significant'
act was thus the breach that occurred in the United States." Id.
135. See id.
136. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618-19.
137. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
138. See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 895-96. For a background discussion of
Callejo, see supra note 90.
139. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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By expanding the jurisdictional limits, the Fifth Circuit
has radically altered the commercial activity exception. Under
the court's formulation, the direct effect analysis favors juris-
diction over foreign states rather than preserving sovereign
immunity.140 As a substitute for traditional personal jurisdic-
tion analysis, the "immediate consequences" test reaches sig-
nificantly further than the minimum contacts standard. 41 In
at least some cases granting jurisdiction, the plaintiffs would
not have been able to establish minimum contacts. 42 In effect,
the standard has been set so low that virtually any determina-
tion of jurisdiction will not constitute an abuse of discretion,
whether or not jurisdiction is asserted over the foreign sover-
eign. 143
Voest-Alpine's reliance on Callejo raises the question
whether any limits to jurisdiction remain under the direct ef-
fect clause."44 Critics of the Weltover decision would respond
with an emphatic "no," arguing that the third clause of the
commercial activity exception has been effectively reduced to a
rubber stamp. 145 Any financial loss suffered by an American
individual or corporation is likely to trigger the exception. 46
Whether or not this argument has merit, Weltover clearly low-
ered the standard for granting jurisdiction. 147 As a result, the
140. See Gohlke, supra note 21, at 283.
141. See Lew, supra note 24, at 768-69. As Lew points out, "[bjy adopting
a liberal standard for determining subject matter jurisdiction over U.S. law-
suits brought against non-U.S. governments, the [Supreme] Court indicated a
desire to assert jurisdiction over a greater number of non-U.S. governments."
Id.
142. See Wydeven, supra note 3, at 171-72.
143. See Gohlke, supra note 21, at 296.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., Gohlke, supra note 21, at 297 ("Had the FSIA been passed
ten years later than it was, the Court may not have been able to so easily run
roughshod over the intent of Congress."); Leacock, supra note 15, at 120-21
("The Court's decision in Republic of Argentina [v. Weltover, Inc.] is disap-
pointing... [Weltover] created a risk of lowering the threshold of direct effect
in the United States, thereby effectively reducing the circumstances in which
a sovereign state may invoke sovereign immunity.").
146. See, e.g., Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 897 ("In sum, we hold that a finan-
cial loss incurred in the United States by an American plaintiff.., constitutes
a direct effect. . . under the third clause of the commercial activity exception
to the FSIAO"). Courts adopting the legally significant act requirement seem
to suggest that it was intended to require more than a mere financial loss by
an American party to trigger the exception. See supra note 64 and accompa-
nying text.
147. See Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 896 ("Weltover simply lowered the stan-
dard for finding jurisdiction under the third clause.").
[Vol. 83:9971020
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
international market has been left without a guide as to what
extent parties to transactions can rely on exceptions to immu-
nity under the FSIA.
C. PROTECTING THE STABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS: THE NEED FOR A STANDARD THAT BALANCES
COMPETING INTERESTS
Voest-Alpine's departure from the legally significant act
requirement in favor of a strict interpretation of the
"immediate consequences" test represents more than just a
preference for a lower standard for finding jurisdiction under
the third clause. The decision ultimately has'the potential to
affect future commercial transactions between foreign states
and American corporations.14  A lower standard for jurisdic-
tion is protective of American business interests because it
provides corporations with a forum in which to secure enforce-
ment a foreign state's contractual obligations. 49 However, in
the long run, an extremely low standard may be overprotective,
and could potentially damage relations between the United
States and foreign governments.
1. Protecting Business Interests
A low standard for granting jurisdiction protects American
business interests because it guarantees a fair, adequate rem-
edy for individuals and corporations transacting with foreign
sovereigns. 50 If American corporations or individuals are not
provided sufficient remedies when dealing with foreign gov-
ernments, they will be reluctant to enter commercial transac-
tions in the future.'5 ' An increased risk of loss will raise the
costs of dealing with foreign governments and will make inter-
national transactions more complicated and less efficient. 52
Corporations involved in overseas transactions will find it nec-
essary to undergo a cost-benefit analysis to weigh the increased
costs of associating with a foreign sovereign versus the poten-
tial benefits of expanding their operations in the international
market.153
148. See Donoghue, supra note 23, at 521.
149. See id
150. See id.; Brockbank, supra note 70, at 18.
151. See Brockbank, supra note 70, at 18.
152. See id
153. See id.
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Although Congress designed the FSIA to furnish a forum
for adjudication of commercial disputes and to provide security
in contractual relations, the lack of uniformity among circuit
courts applying the Act suggests that it has been unable to
provide a sufficient amount of stability in international agree-
ments.1 54 The "vague nature of the commercial activity excep-
tion" has prevented the development of any consistent case
law. 55 Failure to establish definite guidelines for the exception
has infused the FSIA with uncertainty and unpredictability.
56
Parties involved in international transactions cannot predict
accurately whether nonperformance of their agreements will
result in unanticipated, unpredictable, and expensive legal
problems.15 7 This uncertainty suggests that determinations of
jurisdiction under the FSIA should be based on a uniform
standard.
By rejecting the "legally significant act" requirement, the
Voest-Alpine court clearly favored American corporate interests
over foreign sovereignty.5s Yet this decision may not have a
desirable effect. Although the court's decision protects Ameri-
can business interests by providing a forum for adjudicating
commercial disputes, it may ultimately damage relations with
foreign governments. 159 Just as excess grants of immunity may
cause American corporations to decrease their participation in
the international market, the same chilling effect will logically
occur if foreign governments are overly burdened by excess liti-
gation.' 6 Thus, adopting such a low standard for jurisdiction
may actually work contrary to the court's intent; although it
may stabilize international agreements, it may act as a disin-
centive for foreign sovereigns who do not wish to be dragged
into U.S. courts, and may ultimately decrease the amount of
international transactions.161
154 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
155. See Brockbank, supra note 70, at 20.
156. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
157. See Ramsey, supra note 1, at 76.
158. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
159. See Leacock, supra note 15, at 121.
160. See id.; cf Brockbank, supra note 70, at 22 (noting that excess grants
of immunity will result in a chilling effect).
161. In contrast to Brockbank, who argues that a chilling effect will result
if immunity is granted too often in situations where a sovereign acts in a
commercial capacity, this argument focuses on the opposite side of the equa-
tion. If U.S. courts follow Brockbank's suggestions and are overly protective
of American business interests, foreign governments are more likely to reduce
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2. Avoiding the Foreign Policy Risks of Excess Jurisdiction:
How a Higher Standard Benefits the International
Marketplace
The Voest-Alpine decision loses sight of the justifications
underlying the FSIA. As a codified theory of restrictive immu-
nity, the FSIA was designed to balance the competing interests
of American individuals seeking a forum to adjudicate com-
mercial disputes and the sovereign interests of foreign gov-
ernments. 162 Consequently, the analysis under the commercial
activity exception must go beyond protecting American busi-
ness interests. Courts interpreting the direct effect clause
should also consider the interests of foreign governments in
being free from excessive litigation and the hindrance of de-
fending the propriety of their acts before foreign courts. 163 Two
important considerations should regulate the desire to promote
American business interests over those of foreign govern-
ments. 164 First, courts should consider their decisions in terms
of reciprocity and how exercising jurisdiction will affect the
United States as a defendant in foreign courts. 16 Second,
courts should be aware of the foreign policy risks of exercising
jurisdiction. 66
By favoring American business interests, Voest-Alpine fails
to consider either of these factors. As a result, it increases the
likelihood that actions against foreign states will have adverse
foreign policy consequences. 67 In addition to creating a politi-
cally sensitive situation,168 the real threat of loss and the possi-
bility of litigation raise the costs of international transac-
tions. 69 In order to avoid these costs, foreign governments may
opt to forego relations with American entities in favor of less
troublesome alternatives, such as making do with their own
resources or working with other international companies. This
their contact with American corporations for fear of being too easily dragged
into U.S. courts. See Leacock, supra note 15, at 121.
162. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
163. See Donoghue, supra note 23, at 520-21.
164. See id. at 521.
165. See id
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 1, at 76-77 (noting that application of
the commercial activity exception may be problematic in certain circum-
stances because it might require the judiciary to scrutinize sensitive political
situations).
168. See 1d.
169. See Brockbank, supra note 70, at 22.
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shift could have far-reaching consequences for the stability of
the foreign marketplace.1 70 Although foreign governments
would be avoiding the possibility of litigation, the alternatives
may be more costly and less efficient. 171 Because "[the maxi-
mum flow of private foreign capital, trade, and technology is
critically important for all countries,"172 the resulting ineffi-
ciencies may lead to a depression in overseas markets.
The legally significant act requirement avoids the prob-
lems of a low standard by providing clearer, more favorable
standards for foreign governments to assess their relationships
with American businesses. 73 Unlike the immediate conse-
quences test, these standards reflect a more measured com-
promise between the competing interests underlying the poli-
cies of the FSIA.174 The legally significant act requirement
promotes sovereignty interests to the extent that it provides a
higher standard for granting jurisdiction. 175 Foreign govern-
ments can rest assured that the direct effect clause will not be
interpreted in a manner that grants jurisdiction over virtually
any suit arising out of an international transaction in which an
American citizen claims to have suffered a loss from the acts of
a foreign state. 176 Furthermore, foreign states are less likely to
face the prospect of unanticipated litigation. The legally sig-
nificant act requirement relies on more consistent standards
that are less susceptible to unpredictable judicial interpreta-
tion. The benefits of these consistent standards are twofold:
foreign governments know what to expect when they enter into
commercial transactions, and U.S. courts need not worry about
the political ramifications of exercising jurisdiction over sover-
eign states.
While the legally significant act requirement removes the
blanket protection of the immediate consequences test, it will
not negatively impact American businesses."7 In many cases,
170. See id.
17L See id.
172. Id.
173. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of the competing interests underlying the FSIA, see
supra Part 11.C.1.
175. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
176. See United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33
F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 1994).
177. The legally significant act requirement represents only a slightly
higher requirement than the immediate consequences test set forth in Voest-
Alpine. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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the outcome of the analysis will be the same as the immediate
consequences test because international transactions involving
American corporations generally involve some legally signifi-
cant act in the United States.178 Furthermore, American busi-
nesses concerned about the stability of international transac-
tions can try to mitigate the uncertainty by requiring foreign
governments to opt out of their immunity by contractual
agreement.17 9 The FSIA contains a waiver exception that al-
lows parties to contract out of foreign sovereign immunity.8 '
While there is no guarantee that a court will enforce a par-
ticular agreement,181 the statutory opt-out provision provides
an extra layer of security in international transactions. A well-
drafted waiver provision increases the likelihood that a foreign
sovereign will be subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts, effec-
tively eliminating the threat of nonrecourse. Thus, even
though the legally significant act requirement may make it
slightly more difficult for American individuals and corporations
to obtain jurisdiction over foreign governments, parties will
still retain the ability to avoid the problems associated with
non-enforcement of commercial disputes.
CONCLUSION
Voest-Alpine's rejection of the legally significant act re-
quirement and strict adherence to the immediate consequences
test revives the same concerns originally raised by the Su-
preme Court in Weltover. Using the strict language of Welto-
ver, it is quite possible that district courts could become small
international claims courts. The immediate consequences
standard is a significantly easier test for plaintiffs, and is
much more skewed towards granting jurisdiction over foreign
states rather than preserving sovereign immunity.
As more foreign governments are brought into U.S. courts,
this preference for granting jurisdiction may cause a chilling
effect on international transactions. Faced with the possibility
that U.S. courts will grant jurisdiction in virtually any suit
arising out of an international transaction in which an Ameri-
178. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618-19
(1992).
179. See Brockbank, supra note 70, at 21.
180. See id. Brockbank suggests that the waiver exception could cure
many of the problems associated with the FSIA, but notes that it is rarely in-
voked. See id.
181. See id. at 22.
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can citizen claims to have suffered a loss, foreign governments
may opt to seek less complicated alternatives. Consequently,
this shift will reduce the amount of available international op-
portunities for American businesses and severely limit the
overall efficiency of the international market.
The legally significant act requirement presents a viable
solution to the problem. Under this formulation, jurisdiction is
limited to situations where the effect felt in the United States
is a direct result of the foreign state's misconduct. In contrast
to the immediate consequences test, this heightened standard
better reflects a balance between the competing interests un-
derlying the FSIA. Foreign governments are less likely to re-
duce their participation with American businesses because the
requirement provides predictable results that can be taken into
account before an agreement is established. At the same time,
American businesses receive nearly the same protection as the
immediate consequences test. Overall, the legally significant
act requirement promotes stability in international transac-
tions by offering a uniform standard that properly balances the
interests of individuals doing business with foreign govern-
ments in having their legal rights determined by the courts,
and the interest of foreign governments in being free to par-
ticipate in the international market without undergoing the
embarrassment or hindrance of defending the propriety of such
participation before foreign courts.
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